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influences upon policy formulation inherent in normal arms-length relations
between the Executive Branch and Congress.
Difficult to accept without question is Mr. Thomas' conclusion that the Joint
Committee device provides an effective means for preserving democratic control
over the-atomic energy program. In a sense the five-man Commission operating
on a majority rule basis provides some measure of democratic control of policy
development, but even assuming that the AEC and the Committee dealt at
arms length, it would mean at best that the closed-door decisions of a five-man
Commission would be subject to legislative review only by, in effect, an
eighteen-man closed-door Congress. However, considering the Committee's fre-
quent self-identification with AEC policy objectives and its active initiation
and sponsorship of AEC policies, what means are available for preserving
democratic control over the AEC-Committee joint venture? Quite possibly the
existence of the Committee makes possible more democratic control than
would exist in its absence, but it is clear that the Joint Committee device pro-
vides somewhat less than adequate democratic control.
Atomic Energy and Congress is a valuable contribution to the unfortunately
small body of literature relating to the politics of atomic energy in the United
States. Mr. Thomas undoubtedly is correct in his conclusion that the nation
has benefited substantially, from the standpoint of its national resources and
strength, from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. It is much more likely,
however, that history will attribute these benefits to the responsibility, integrity,
devotion and ability of the members and staff of the Committee, rather than
to the Committee as a unique governmental institution. In any event, it is un-
fortunate that Mr. Thomas has concentrated his efforts on an historical sum-
mary of events, based largely upon personalities, rather than probing more
deeply the significance to our traditional democratic political institutions of
existing legislative control of atomic energy.
HAROLD P. GREEN*
* Member of the Illinois and Washington, D.C. Bars.
Corporation Giving in a Free Society. By Richard Eells. New York: Harper &
Bros., 1956. Pp. 203. $3.50.
Our non-profit institutions and foundations, one of whose principal sources
of income is the return from their own capital endowment, have been particu-
larly hard hit by inflation. Consequently a search for new benefactors began
some time ago. It was apparent that the vast number of relatively small indi-
vidual contributions would continue to be the main support, although an in-
adequate one. Large additions on a grand scale were required to meet the ever
increasing needs, but the Rockefellers, Carnegies, Vanderbilts, and Dukes of a
past era were no longer available.
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Corporation Giving in a Free Society has been written by Richard Eells, man-
ager of public relations research at General Electric, to convince corporations
that they should make such contributions. These contributions should be made,
however, only after arriving at a proper justification and an appropriate pro-
gram. The book also supplies the standards for both of these requirements.
In the first chapter, "The New Philanthropy," Mr. Eells states his basic
premise that "corporate enterprise has a paramount duty to fight for the sur-
vival of a basically healthy social pattern that liberates man's creative energies,
and to combat the suffocating forces of mandated conformity" (p. 11). The
author makes it clear that he does not believe that corporations are living up
to this responsibility. Although the Internal Revenue Code allows 5 per cent of
corporate earnings to be deducted for charitable contributions, less than 1.2 per
cent of such earnings are going for this purpose. Corporate contributions have
never reached 10 per cent of the total income of non-profit institutions, whereas,
if the full amount allowed by the tax laws had been given, this figure would
have been in the range of 50 per cent.
While admitting that if a "company ... engages in charity 'qua charity,' it
reflects an altruism more laudable than defensible as an exercise of corporate
authority" (p. 7), the author quickly brushes aside the notion that corporations
are strictly business enterprises whose contributions must be defensible as a
matter of business expense. "In this type of thinking, a general theory of cor-
porate giving becomes lost in knotty legal problems; in the economics of share
ownership; in the changing views of legislators and judges; and finally in broad
issues of public and corporate policy" (p. 6). Mr. Eells is not one to become
lost in these knotty problems, or even face them. A dilemma may seem to exist,
but in the shell game of enlightened self-interest, all dilemmas disappear. Still,
a basic ambivalence as to whether or not there is anything contradictory in the
notion of corporate gifts is apparent throughout the book, in spite of repeated
protestations that only the broader interests of corporations are being served.
In the second chapter, "Authority for Giving," Mr. Eells relies mainly, and
properly, on the now famous A. P. Smith case1 to establish the legal authority
for corporate giving without charter authority. He is quite right when he points
out that the nub of the legal matter is directors' liability to suit by disgruntled
stockholders and that both the case and the permissive legislation there in
question were designed to formulate a "business judgment" rule in the area of
corporate contributions. The desirability of this removal of self-help from the
arsenal of stockholders is never questioned. The justification for such contribu-
tions, however, "is not what it achieves for the community alone, but rather
what it does to protect the wider corporate environment that sustains the share
owners' profitable investment" (p. 29).
In his chapter entitled "Tax Policy" the author makes a plea for tax laws
which would encourage even greater corporate giving. This chapter is concerned
' A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
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mainly with proving that charitable deductions do not involve real losses for
the government, but rather in the long run provide the basis for an ever increas-
ing national income. Within certain limits this probably is true, but the entire
discussion seems unnecessary, since what the author states must apply to all
contributions, not just to those made by corporations 2
The next chapter is entitled "Public Accountability." A large part of this
chapter unaccountably is devoted to a discussion of the recent Reece committee
investigation of tax-free foundations. Mr. Eells properly points out that the
issue in charitable deductions is not whether Congress might have appropriated
funds for the same purpose. Indeed this is almost the negation of such deduc-
tions, since it would appear that the basic intent must be to encourage areas
that government either may not, should not or will not enter. Contributed funds
are only "public funds" in a very narrow and legalistic sense; they are not
comparable to government revenues. But all this is a long way from the issue
of corporate contributions, as such.
Apparently Mr. Eells is concerned because at some time in the future a
Reece-type committee may look hard into the operation of a foundation estab-
lished as an adjunct of a commercial corporation. Both the new and the older
foundations must therefore forestall any attempt at government intervention
and control. The author maintains that to do this corporations must develop a
"voluntary system of public accountability." This continuing sort of public
relations program will include "organized collaboration," "self-investigation,"
a clearing house operation and a system of public reporting.
Under the heading "Theory of Corporate Giving: A Philosophy of Govern-
ment," the author discusses the criticism of corporate giving which maintains
that if corporations stray out of the purely income-maximizing sphere into
other and less differentiated areas of community endeavor, then new social
functions will come to be recognized, and either regulation or some new enforced
scheme of community agency will result. Either of these alternatives would be
contrary to what the author calls "the basic purpose of corporate enterprise"
(p. 80). This basic purpose is apparently mere self-preservation, although self-
preservation for what is not made clear.3 Free enterprise, the author maintains,
requires not merely that government allow business associations their economic
freedom, but that government be prevented from interfering unduly with the
whole panorama of private associations, whatever their nature. Thus, any con-
tributions which tend to build up these "private sectors" of society and preserve
2 Presumably the individual entrepreneur, not acting in concert with other entrepreneurs,
is not included in this analysis. This group, doing over 20 per cent of the nation's business,
apparently escape the responsibilities found resting on incorporated concerns, although the
logic of all Mr. Eells says must apply equally to any private business. Perhaps this is an over-
sight; but it is more likely that the author really is thinking only of very large publicly held
companies. This distinction is never made explicit.
3 Possibly for the continuance of corporate giving, which the author views as "one of the
great fruits of the free enterprise system" (p. 188).
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them in the ever increasing struggle against big government, are blows struck
for free enterprise and a clear responsibility for corporations.
In one sentence the author also acknowledges that corporate power, and pre-
sumably that of any voluntary association, may be a threat to the liberty of
individuals (p. 98). The solution offered to combat this menace is neither new
nor satisfying. Its genesis is found in the works of Berle, Lilienthal and others.
What must be developed, it is held, is a "corporate conscience," i.e., good cor-
porate citizenship. Conscience, countervailing power, and "constitutionalizing"
of these private governments are all needed to channel properly and safely the
vast social power of the large corporation. 4 One concludes this chapter, however,
with strong doubts about whether these terms can ever be given sufficient
meaning and substance. The "conscience" of a corporation, guided neither by
the market nor the courts, is a problematic safeguard at best.
Credit must be given to the chapter entitled "Principles and Programs,"
wherein certain general rules to be followed by any particular company are set
forth. The emphasis is upon formulation by each company of a donation policy
that will reflect its own peculiar circumstances, thus tending to spread contri-
butions through a great variety of disciplines and activities. An example used
is that of a cosmetic manufacturing company contributing for basic research in
the biological sciences and, since there is an affiliate company in France, making
an additional grant for research in international law and economics. This idea
is a good one, as there is probably some correlation between the need for research
in certain areas and the amount of interest businesses will have in such research.
The advantage of such a scheme is that it prevents accidental concentrations
in particular lines of endeavor or in particular institutions or types of institu-
tions. However, it does not guarantee that some areas will not be slighted.
One might well take issue, however, with the author's classification of certain
areas as being inappropriate for government activity. Basic research has proved
to be a valuable investment for many corporations; in many instances it surely
is a legitimate corporate activity. Perhaps government programs do not exhibit
the originality or initiative of private industrial research. But when one consid-
ers the present structure of our patent laws, particularly as related to the
monopoly problem, more, rather than less, non-patentable government devel-
opments might seem to be indicated.' Mr. Eells also thinks that the corpora-
tion is a more appropriate institution for the study of automation-caused un-
employment problems than is the government. But this is merely the problem
of distributing market information to suppliers who might otherwise have diffi-
culty in discovering their own best opportunities. This would seem to be pecul-
4 The efficacy of competition as a possible check on arbitrary business activities is not even
dignified by a denial.
5 Consult Simons, Economic Policy for A Free Society 248 (1948). For a similar view by
several university presidents toward research consult N.Y. Times p. 15, col. 2 (June 25, 1956).
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iarly a responsibility of government. It appears that no interference with any
legitimate private interest would result.'
In a chapter called "Public Acceptance" Mr. Eells has set forth what presum-
ably is a technically appropriate approach to the public relations problem in-
volved in selling the gift scheme to the individuals concerned. Simply stated,
the program involves convincing stockholders and managers that corporations
are really being quite selfish about the whole thing. But this book is not convinc-
ing as an attempt to persuade stockholders and managers that corporate con-
tributions on a large scale will make more money for them. It is probable that
most Americans still are convinced that the greatest good is served when every
individual business enterprise competitively seeks its own greatest gain. In
spite of the author's denials, a strong suspicion arises that notions of corporate
social responsibility tamper with this traditional conception and that a new and
radically altered form of economy is being proposed. 7 David Riesman has, with
characteristic insight, described the school to which Mr. Eells belongs:
Since up-to-date American corporations now have to learn the art of conspicuous
spending, they need tutors-just as European princes did or American tycoons. Busi-
ness schools... play a part as such tutors; so do management consultants; so do indus-
trial architects and designers. There are corporate officials who are addicts of one or
another of the many fads.., and go about the country stumping for these devices
and their morale-building and profit-building virtues. For these "muscular Christians"
of enterprise, trade does not necessarily follow the flag and the Bible; these men act
in obedience to their self-image as proper businessmen, no matter how strenuously they
insist (as, depending on mood, most Americans will insist) that they act only out of
self-interest. 8
Corporations certainly have a legitimate interest in the preservation of a
control-free commercial sector. It can be said, however, that this responsibility
is met in the more mundane, every-day attempts of corporations to avoid the
long arm of government control. No one questions in principle the legitimacy
of natural gas companies' lobbying for the repeal of government price controls,
even though some of their methods appear either high handed or completely
inept. Dishonesty, of course, raises another issue. Nor would anyone blame
private power companies for resisting government efforts to preclude them from
apparently profitable opportunities. This, however, is a far cry from the boost
private enterprise gets from most social science research.
Furthermore, absent monopoly 9 or possibly other institutional hurdles in the
I Simons, op. cit. supra note 5, at 325.
Adolph Berle is much more honest about his view of the American industrial concentrate
as a mere variant of the collectivism found in other countries. Consult Berle, The Developing
Law of Industrial Concentration, 19 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 639, 660 (1952).
8 Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered 294 (1954).
1 Usually the issue of corporate responsibility is fought in terms of the amount of monopoly
in the economy.
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way of a free market system, there is no reason to believe that corporations
will be able to step too far from their traditional role. The market will supply a
corrective whenever the object of corporate charity becomes too attenuated
from the profit goal.
The entire scheme of corporate contribution may be satisfactory to the ex-
tent that stockholders want their contributions made by their corporate man-
agers, or to the extent that stockholders are indifferent to the expense. 0 But it
is a certainty that no company's stock ever appreciated in value because of a
charitable contribution made by that company. Capital markets, like any
others, cause a distribution of supplies in accordance with the expectation of
highest return in a foreseeable and meaningful future." Mr. Eells has said
nothing to disprove the conception that the needs of the community are served
best when business enterprise, of any size, follows a selfish motivation. What is
viewed as meeting social responsibilities, if that phrase is to have any meaning,
must to some extent warp what would otherwise be the most socially beneficial
distribution of resources. There is no known way of accurately comparing the
economic benefits lost to the social benefits gained by corporate support of
worthy charities. Absent such a method of comparison it can never be known
whether the net result is more beneficial than it is harmful.
The desirability of corporate contributions is more questionable than the
purely economic considerations might indicate. There is an effect on individual
attitudes as well as on pocketbooks. We might expect this effect to be great in
time, since in the last analysis it is the charitable nature or the social conscience
of individuals to which appeal is being made in the quest for corporate contri-
butions. Conceivably many individual stockholders may find less reason for
their own contributions if the corporation in which they own shares is viewed
as contributing for them. To the extent that the stockholder views his corpora-
tion as an entity apart from himself (probably the predominant view for stock-
holders of larger corporations) the effect will be slight. But the rationalization,
or more properly the reality, of ownership is always available to any individual
shareholder who seeks a reason for a smaller personal contribution.
Of even greater concern might be the effect of large corporate donations on
the contributions of the community as a whole. The increased publicity being
given to larger corporate donations, coupled with a growing belief that the
efforts of the individual citizen largely are without effect, might cause us to
10 There obviously are tax advantages for the stockholder viewing an aliquot share of the
corporation's contributions as his own, since he may assume his dividend was really larger to
that extent, though the difference does not enter the taxable income stream. With one man
or closely held companies this fact has important implications for the tax planner.
,, The known effect of non-profit-yielding expenditures on capital costs is blunted considera-
bly by the common financial practice of retaining approximately one-half of income plus depre-
ciation and other reserves. A policy of greater distributions would probably make stockholders
far more sensitive about corporate charity.
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expect a constantly diminishing private donation. Even though the quantitative
aspects are impossible to predict accurately, these factors are present and
should be considered in any full analysis of the implications of corporate giving.
The great increase in corporate giving suggests another problem that is inde-
pendent of a possible decrease in individual donations. Mr. Eells properly is
concerned with the dangers involved in the government's moving into any
vacuum created by the insufficiency of individual contributions. Many univer-
sities have signified their own concern about adopting a research program rely-
ing heavily on government funds. Without going into any of the details, it
should be sufficient to point out that when a university or private foundation
becomes dependent upon the government as its principal source of funds, it has
lost that integrity and independence which epitomize the importance of free,
private social institutions."2 The danger lies both in the loss of independence
and in the uncertainty of continuing support inherent in the vagaries of politics.
Unfortunately these same dangers are inherent in relying on corporate dona-
tions. No more than government can commercial enterprises be expected to
tolerate destructive or harmful ideas; excessive dependence on corporate treas-
uries necessarily must result in a certain degree of conformity. As in the case of
government support there is a problem arising from uncertainty in the availa-
bility of corporate funds. Schools and larger research institutes must plan their
programs over periods of time that do not necessarily correspond with those
most convenient for corporate donations to be made. Finally a reckoning must
be made with the cyclical effects of the total economy and with the rising and
falling positions of various individual firms.
These warnings must be directed not so much towards the corporate donors
ag their expected donees. This is especially true if a program such as envisioned
by Mr. Eells were to be adopted, for he advises a clearing house for all corporate
contributions, thus centralizing the control aspect. The dangers evident here
are somewhat reminiscent of those inherent in cooperation among competitors
in the more dearly economic fields. The ultimate effect, whether or not intended,
is a vastly augmented power.' 3
As the very suggestion of corporate gifts raises the fear of corporate control,
so the complete success of such a venture raises an increased possibility of the
thing most feared-increased government control. The use of funds realistically
belonging to a vast number of stockholders (or politically more important,
to union welfare funds, private welfare organizations and commercial invest-
ment companies) ultimately must strike a more or less opportunistic legislator
as a practice worthy of investigation, or even protective controls. Public ac-
"2Unrestricted funds, of course, present far less danger.
13 Certain university presidents are as aware of the problems inherent in corporation giving
as they are alert to the dangers of government grants. Consult statement of principle by the
presidents of Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale Universi-
ties, N.Y. Times, loc. cit. supra note 5.
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countability, as Mr. Eells terms it, may serve to ameliorate these effects, but it
will be the existence of such activity on a substantial scale, not necessarily its
results, which will raise the flag for men in government.
The author is quick to point out that the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
A. P. Smith case, while admitting a corporate social responsibility, rejected the
concept of a corporate "duty" to support the private sectors of society. Yet how
far apart are these two concepts? Does not the court's language at least leave
serious doubts about the unconstitutionality of legislation requiring corpora-
tions to donate a certain percentage of their income annually to tax-exempt
institutions? And is this not perhaps the very antithesis of what the author
proclaims?
Finally, there is the peculiar problem of increased government control of
business itself, and more specifically, the large publicly held corporation. Today
the prestige of big business is at a high not experienced for several decades. But
who knows that public opinion may not change next year, or ten years from
now? To the extent that business has moved out of its traditional profit-making
function and into quasi-governmental and social welfare areas, fuel will be
available to those in government who may wish to control this vast corporate
power. A government, as history illustrates frequently, can exhibit a vicious
jealousy of its power. Government cannot tolerate losing too many of its pre-
rogatives to "private sectors," nor can it tolerate strong competition in the
business of governing. Perhaps one of the greatest dangers in what Mr. Eells
advocates is that it will be too successful.
One must perhaps make an addendum to this review, lest he be suspected of
an entirely negative attitude. As has been said earlier, and for that matter rec-
ognized prior to the A. P. Smith case, there is a legitimate area for corporate
contributions to non-profit enterprises. Even though these contributions are
limited realistically to those having a direct bearing on a company's business,
the list is not a short one. It might include, among other things, contributions
to any institutions located in the same area as a corporation's plant, basic
research in the company's own field, employee welfare and aid to schools which
might be furnishing a substantial number of graduates to the company. 4 An
excellent example of a constructive plan along these lines is the corporation
practice of matching contributions made by an employee to his own school.
Many corporations undoubtedly have developed satisfactory solutions to this
problem, but viewed along these lines, Mr. Eells's book will be of little practical
value.
Perhaps not enough effort is devoted today to encouraging individual concern
for the great private, non-profit institutions of our society. To date we have
merely the identification of a social need and a grab for the deepest pocket avail-
14 Religious programs and basic research in the social sciences, however, seem particularly
foreign to corporate enterprise.
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able. But if the choice is between government or large corporation controls on
the one hand and an almost painful amount of individual contributions on the
other, prudence dictates the latter alternative. The government would follow a
more proper course of action if it encouraged such contributions by increasing
the percentage deduction allowed for individual charitable contributions.
HENRY G. MAuE*
*Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
International Law and Asylum as a Human Right. By Manuel R. Garcia-Mora.
Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pp. vii, 171. $4.50.
The author of this important study locates the problem of asylum in the
broad field of human rights. After noting the persecutions of recent years, espe-
cially by totalitarian governments with an underlying philosophy hostile to
ethnic, linguistic, religious or political minorities within their jurisdiction, he
writes:
It is for people thus persecuted that asylum appears as the only hope, especially
when the United Nations Charter does not give individuals the right to appeal directly
to the Security Council, the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice
if any of the rights mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are vio-
lated. In the absence of such a procedure, international law has no other choice but to
recognize a person's right to demand asylum in foreign territory when confronted with
revolutionary upheavals and tyrannical regimes. As long as the law of nations does not
provide for a centralized machinery to which the individual could resort directly for
the adequate protection of his rights and values, asylum as a human right is filling a
gap in the international legal order [p. 163].
There has been a great deal of juristic and other discussion concerning the
best way to realize the commitments of the United Nations to assure general
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The first method under-
taken by the United Nations was to achieve a clear definition of these rights,
and this was partially accomplished in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, approved by the General Assembly in 1948. This instrument describes
itself as "a common standard of achievement of all people and all nations,"
rather than as a legally binding instrument. The United Nations has attempted
to develop the principles of the Declaration into "covenants" of human rights,
which would have the latter character, but has encountered great difficulties.
Not the least of these difficulties has been the attitude of the United States
government which, under the pressure of the Bricker Amendment movement,
declared in 1953 that it had no intention of seeking the ratification of such
coyenants.
Instead, the United States proposed a program of education, which it called
an "action program," including annual reports from members on their progress
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